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Abstract
Operating in a dynamic real world environment requires a forward thinking and adversarial aware design for classi-
fiers, beyond fitting the model to the training data. In such scenarios, it is necessary to make classifiers - a) harder to
evade, b) easier to detect changes in the data distribution over time, and c) be able to retrain and recover from model
degradation. While most works in the security of machine learning has concentrated on the evasion resistance (a)
problem, there is little work in the areas of reacting to attacks (b and c). Additionally, while streaming data research
concentrates on the ability to react to changes to the data distribution, they often take an adversarial agnostic view of
the security problem. This makes them vulnerable to adversarial activity, which is aimed towards evading the concept
drift detection mechanism itself. In this paper, we analyze the security of machine learning, from a dynamic and
adversarial aware perspective. The existing techniques of Restrictive one class classifier models, Complex learning
models and Randomization based ensembles, are shown to be myopic as they approach security as a static task. These
methodologies are ill suited for a dynamic environment, as they leak excessive information to an adversary, who can
subsequently launch attacks which are indistinguishable from the benign data. Based on empirical vulnerability anal-
ysis against a sophisticated adversary, a novel feature importance hiding approach for classifier design, is proposed.
The proposed design ensures that future attacks on classifiers can be detected and recovered from. The proposed work
presents motivation, by serving as a blueprint, for future work in the area of Dynamic-Adversarial mining, which
combines lessons learned from Streaming data mining, Adversarial learning and Cybersecurity.
Keywords: Adversarial machine learning, Streaming data, Concept drift, Ensemble, Feature information hiding,
Evasion
1. Introduction
The machine learning gold rush has led to a prolif-
eration of predictive models, being used at the core of
several cybersecurity applications. Machine learning
allows for scalable and swift interpolation from large
quantities of data, and also provides generalize-ability
to improve longevity of the security mechanisms. How-
ever, the increased exuberance in the application of ma-
chine learning has led to the overlooking of its secu-
rity vulnerabilities. Recent works on adversarial ma-
chine learning (Sethi et al., 2017; Papernot et al., 2017,
2016b; Trame`r et al., 2016), have demonstrated that de-
ployed classification systems are vulnerable to adver-
sarial perturbations at test time, which cause the models
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to degrade over time. Such attacks on the integrity of
machine learning systems, are termed as exploratory at-
tacks (Barreno et al., 2006), as they are caused at test
time, by an adversary learning and evading the charac-
teristics of the deployed classifier model. An example
of such an attack is shown in Figure 1, where an adver-
sary learns the behavior of the spam detection system,
and then crafts emails so as to avoid being flagged. Sim-
ilar attacks have been shown to be possible on computer
vision systems (Papernot et al., 2016b), speech recog-
nition systems (Carlini et al., 2016) and also on natural
language processing systems (Hosseini et al., 2017).
Owing to the pressing need for secure machine learn-
ing systems, there has been considerable recent at-
tention towards improving the resilience of such sys-
tems (Papernot et al., 2016c; Wang, 2015; Smutz and
Stavrou, 2016). However, the entire research effort in
the security of machine learning is split into two schools
of thought: a) Proactive security measures, and b) Re-
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Figure 1: Illustration of exploratory attacks on a machine learning
based spam filtering system.
active security measures. Proactive security is aimed
towards anticipating adversary strategies, and making
systems resistant to possible attacks (Hardt et al., 2016;
Wang, 2015; Biggio et al., 2010a; Stevens and Lowd,
2013; Xu et al., 2014; Colbaugh and Glass, 2012b;
Vorobeychik and Li, 2014). These methods focus on
prevention, with the aim of delaying an attack till the
maximum possible extent. As shown in Figure 2) a),
these defensive measures aim at increasing the attackers
effort δP, which is needed to degrade the target system’s
performance (evade the system). Work on proactive se-
curity views the attack-defense problem as a static one,
with the intention of bolstering defenses before deploy-
ing the system.
While works on proactive security emphasize on the
prevention problem, Reactive security focuses on the
problem of fixing the system after it is attacked (Barth
et al., 2012; Henke et al., 2015). Reactive security
emphasizes on the detection component of the attack-
defense cycle. These approaches aim at being able to
swiftly detect attacks and fix the system, with limited
human supervision, to make the system available and
effective again. As shown in Figure 2) b), these mea-
sures aim at reducing the delay δR, which is the time
taken by the system to detect degradation and fix (re-
train) the model. Works in the area of concept drift de-
tection and adaptation are suitable for reactive security,
as they do not make any explicit assumption about the
type of change and aim at maintaining high model per-
formance, over time (Minku and Yao, 2012; Brzezinski
and Stefanowski, 2014; Gama et al., 2014). However,
hitherto, the work in the domain of concept drift re-
search has followed a domain agnostic approach, where
any changes to the data distribution is regarded equally,
without any adversarial awareness.
The works on Proactive security and Reactive secu-
rity, approach the challenge of security from different
perspectives. An analogy to explain the two is: Con-
sider the task of securing a precious artifact. Proactive
security aims at securing the vault in which the artifact is
(a) Proactive security aims
at increase time and effort
needed (δP) to degrade a
model
(b) Reactive security aims at
reduce the time taken to detect
attacks and fix them (δR)
Figure 2: Goals of Proactive and Reactive Security.
kept- by making thicker walls, by setting up barricades,
chains and locks, and by keeping track of suspects who
have a history of theft. On the other hand, Reactive se-
curity would concentrate its efforts on setting up surveil-
lance and alarm systems, so as to be able to apprehend
the thief easily, if at all a larceny is attempted. There
is a need for a holistic approach, which combines the
benefits of both these classes of security measures.
Since the adversary is in a never-ending arms race
with the defender, a dynamic and adversarial aware ap-
proach to security is needed. The need for a holistic so-
lution, is illustrated using the example of a 2D synthetic
dataset in Figure 3 a). A classifier model C is trained
on the space of Legitimate class training samples (blue).
The model C is seen to be restrictive, as it allows only
a narrow margin of samples to be admitted into the sys-
tem as benign samples. This strategy is considered to
provide better security from a static perspective, as it
would require an adversary to craft samples in a small
and exact range of feature values. However, looking at
the problem from a dynamic perspective, it is seen that
the space of possible attacks is now highly overlapped
with the training data. As such, once an attack starts,
the adversary has enough information about the feature
space, so as to become indistinguishable from benign
traffic entering the system. These attacks are harder to
detect and also harder to recover from, due to the in-
separability of samples. On the other hand, the simple
design of Figure 3 b) (simple as it reduces the number
of features used in the model C), has a larger space of
possible attacks, making it easier to evade. However,
the increased space means that an adversary evading C
will not be able to completely reverse engineer the loca-
tion and characteristics of the Legitimate training sam-
ples, due to the added uncertainty provided by the large
space of possible attacks.
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(a) Impact of using a restrictive defender model.
(b) Impact of using a simple defender model.
Figure 3: Impact of using a restrictive defender model (top) and that
of using a more generalized defender model (bottom). In case if re-
strictive models, attacks are harder to carry out, but will lead to insep-
arability from benign traffic.
The illustrative example of Figure 3 a) and Figure 3
b), demonstrate the need to develop countermeasures
from a Dynamic - Adversarial perspective. In such an
environment, delaying the onset of attacks, detecting at-
tacks and recovering from them are all equally impor-
tant, for the continued usage of the classification sys-
tem. In this paper, the impact of classifier design strate-
gies on the severity of attacks launched at test time,
is presented. The existing ideas of Randomness (Al-
abdulmohsin et al., 2014; Colbaugh and Glass, 2012a)
and Complex learning (Rndic and Laskov, 2014; Wang,
2015; Biggio et al., 2010b), for securing classifiers, are
evaluated from a dynamic perspective. Also, the ability
to take preemptive measures, to ensure defender’s lever-
age in a dynamic environment, is evaluated. In partic-
ular, the ability to hide feature importance is demon-
strated, as a proactive measure to enable efficient re-
active security. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the first work which combines both adversarial and dy-
namic aspects of the security of machine learning. The
main contributions of this paper are as follows:
• Analyzing the impact of classifier design strate-
gies, in the training phase, on the dynamic capa-
bilities of an adversary, at test time.
• Quantifying the impact of attack severity using the
Adversarial Margin Density (AMD) metric, for de-
termining the ability to detect and recover from at-
tacks.
• Analyzing vulnerabilities of popularly used Re-
strictive, Complex learning and Randomization
based approaches, in a dynamic environment.
• Proposing a counter-intuitive and novel feature
hiding approach, to ensure long term defender
leverage, for better attack detection and model
retrain-ability. This proposed approach serves as
a blueprint for future works in the domain of
Dynamic-Adversarial mining.
• Providing background and motivation for future
work, for a new interdisciplinary area of study
- Dynamic-Adversarial mining, which combines
Streaming data, Machine learning, Cybersecurity
and Adversarial learning, for a holistic approach to
the security of machine learning.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion 2 presents a survey of work in the area of secu-
rity of machine learning. Section 3 presents the analy-
sis methodology for evaluating effects of different clas-
sifier design strategies, on the adversarial activities at
test time. Section 4 presents experimental evaluation of
popular classifier design strategies in the domain of se-
curity: Restrictive one class classifiers, Complex learn-
ing based ensemble methods and Randomization based
classifiers, are evaluated. Based on the analysis, a novel
feature hiding approach is proposed and evaluated in
Section 5. Ideas and motivation for future work in the
domain of Dynamic-Adversarial mining, are presented
in Section 6. Conclusion and avenues for further exten-
sions of the work are presented in Section 7.
2. Related work on security of machine learning
In this section, related work in the domain of machine
learning security is discussed. Section 2.1 presents
work in the area of adversarial manipulation at test
time, which affects the performance of machine learn-
ing based systems. Proactive/Static security measures,
developed in the domain of adversarial machine learn-
ing, are discussed in Section 2.2. Methodologies which
advocate a reactive/dynamic approach to dealing with
attacks are discussed in Section 2.3. The need for a
holistic approach, combining dynamic and adversarial
thinking, is emphasized.
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Figure 4: Illustration of AP attacks. (Left - Right): The defender’s
model from its training data. The Exploration phase depicting the
seed (blue) and the anchor points samples (purple). The Exploitation
attack phase samples (red) generated based on the anchor points.(Sethi
et al., 2017)
2.1. Exploratory attacks on classification based sys-
tems
Machine learning systems deployed in the real world
are vulnerable to exploratory attacks, which aim to de-
grade the learned model, over time. Exploratory attacks
are launched by an adversary, by first learning about the
characteristics of the system through carefully crafted
probes, and then morphing suspicious samples to cause
evasion at test time (Biggio et al., 2014a; Trame`r et al.,
2016; Biggio et al., 2013; Papernot et al., 2016a; Big-
gio et al., 2014b; Sethi et al., 2017). Such attacks are
commonplace and difficult to avoid, as they rely on the
same black box access to the systems, that a benign user
is entitled to. These attacks were shown to affect a wide
variety of classifier types in (Papernot et al., 2016a), and
were also shown to be potent towards ML-as-a-service
(such as Amazon AWS Machine Learning1 and Google
Cloud Platform2), which provide APIs for accessing
predictive analytics as a service (Sethi and Kantardzic,
2017a).
One such black box, data driven, and algorithmic
attack strategy, was proposed in (Sethi et al., 2017).
The work in (Sethi et al., 2017), proposed the Anchor
Points (AP) attack strategy, which uses an exploration-
exploitation framework, to perform evasion on classi-
fiers, as shown in Figure 4. In these attacks, the ad-
versary starts with exploration of the deployed classifier
model(green), by using crafted probing samples. These
samples are submitted to the system, via remote API
calls, and the resulting feedback of Accept/Reject is ob-
served. The AP attack strategy then leverages the sam-
ples which lead to successful evasion, to generate ad-
ditional attack samples (red) via exploitation. These
attack samples will cause the performance of the de-
fender to drop, ultimately leaving it unusable. The AP
1https://aws.amazon.com/machine-learning/
2cloud.google.com/machine-learning
attack strategy provides a domain independent, classi-
fier independent, and simplistic approach to simulate
exploratory attacks and to evaluate the impact of var-
ious security design decisions, on the performance of
the classifier. In this paper, the AP attack strategy will
be extended and used, as a tool for assessing and com-
paring the efficacy of various security mechanisms.
2.2. Proactive/Static approaches for security of ma-
chine learning
Works on proactive security, approach the problem
from a static perspective. Robustness is incorporated
into the model’s design, when it is trained from the ob-
served data, and the system is assumed to be resilient
against future evasion attacks. These techniques are
popular in the adversarial machine learning research do-
main, and the available work can be broadly classified
into the following two categories: a) Complex learning
methods and b) Disinformation methods. These cate-
gories of attacks are discussed in the following sections.
2.2.1. Security based on learning of complex models
These methods increase the complexity of the learned
model, to make it harder for an attacker to effectively
reverse engineer it with a limited number of probes.
The complexity is increased either by using difficult to
mimic features in the classification model (Rndic and
Laskov, 2014), or by balancing weights across features,
such that the resulting classification models are robust
(Rndic and Laskov, 2014; Wang, 2015; Biggio et al.,
2010b). Such robust classifiers require the adversary to
reverse engineer and mimic a large number of features,
thereby increasing its efforts and cost, to successfully
evade the classifier. A practical challenge that these
methods face is the balancing of complexity with over-
fitting, as overfitting can lead to poor generalization per-
formance and can also make the system vulnerable to
training time (causative) attacks (Barreno et al., 2010).
Complexity of the models can be increased systemat-
ically, by distributing weights among informative fea-
tures, to make a classifier robust (Rndic and Laskov,
2014). In (Kołcz and Teo, 2009), feature reweighing
was used by weighting every feature inversely based on
their importance. This made the classification bound-
ary dependent on a larger number of features, thereby
requiring attacks to spend more effort in trying to evade
the classifier. In (Zhang et al., 2015), the task of se-
lecting a reduced feature subset in an adversarial en-
vironment was presented. Classification security was
introduced as a regularization term, in the learning ob-
jective function of the defender’s model. This term was
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optimized along with the classifier’s generalization ca-
pability, during the feature selection process, making
it more secure against evasion attacks on reduced fea-
ture spaces. Robustness to random feature deletion at
test time, caused by noise or by adversarial reverse en-
gineering, was introduced in (Globerson and Roweis,
2006). It was shown that the proposed methodology
was resistant to changes caused by random feature dele-
tion and also to, a reasonable extent, those caused by
deletion based on feature importance. In (Colbaugh and
Glass, 2012b) the predictive defense algorithm was pro-
posed, which adds regularization terms in the min-max
formulation of the objective function, to model adver-
sary actions in aggressively reduced feature spaces. The
objective function optimized in (Colbaugh and Glass,
2012b), is given by Equation 1.
min
w
max
a
−α‖a‖3 + β‖w‖3 + ∑
i
loss(yi,wT (xi + a))

(1)
Where, the loss function represent misclassification
rate and w represents the learned model of the defender.
The attacker attempts to circumvent the defender by us-
ing a linear transform vector a ∈ Rd. The terms α and β
denote the regularization imposed on attackers and de-
fenders, respectively. The term α embodies the effort of
an attacker, which increases based on the distance from
existing samples. The term β denotes the defenders need
to avoid overfitting to the data. By incorporating both
regularization terms into the optimization function, this
method makes it harder for an adversary to apply a sim-
ple linear transformation on a few features of malicious
samples, to get them classified as Legitimate by the de-
fender model. The use of this game theoretic formula-
tion to the problem was shown to outperform a naive
Bayes classifier, used as gold standard, for the task of
spam classification with reduced feature space.
While the above methods rely on adding robustness
to the training of a single classifier, it was shown in
(Biggio et al., 2008, 2010a,b) that combining classi-
fiers trained on different subsets of the data is more suit-
able to the task of security. Multiple Classifier Systems
(MCS)(Woz´niak et al., 2014) allow classifiers trained
on different subsets of the feature space to be combined
in a natural way, to provide an overall robust classifi-
cation prediction. In (Biggio et al., 2010a), instance
bagging and random subspace methods were analyzed,
as two MCS approaches, for securing against evasion
attacks. It was found that both approaches make the
evasion problem harder for the adversary. In particu-
lar, random subspace models are more suitable when a
very small number of features exhibit high discriminat-
ing capability, whereas bagging works better when the
weights are already evenly distributed among the fea-
tures. These methods essentially have the effect of av-
eraging over the feature weights, as models trained on
different views of the problem space are aggregated to
present the final result(Biggio et al., 2010b). Heteroge-
neous combination of one class and binary classifiers, to
produce an evasion resistant model, has also shown to
balance high accuracy with improved security, in works
of (Biggio et al., 2015).
2.2.2. Security based on disinformation
These methods rely on the concept of ‘Security by
obscurity’, and they are aimed at confusing the ad-
versary about the internal state of the system (Biggio
et al., 2014a). The inability of the adversary to accu-
rately ascertain the internal state would then result in
increased delay/effort for performing the attack. Popu-
lar principles for applying disinformation based security
are: Randomization (Huang et al., 2011), Use of honey-
pots (Rowe et al., 2007), Information hiding (Abram-
son, 2015) and Obfuscation (Barreno et al., 2006). An
example obfuscation technique used in case of a classi-
fier filter, is one where the classifier would output cor-
rect prediction with a probability of 0.8, in an attempt
to sacrifice accuracy to provide security. Ideally, hiding
all information about the feature space and classifica-
tion model could result in complete security. However,
this goes against the Kerchkoff’s principles of informa-
tion security (Kerckhoffs, 1883; Mrdovic and Perunicic,
2008), which states that security should not rely overly
on obscurity and that one should always assume that the
adversary knows the system.
When disinformation relies on obfuscation, the
amount of information made available to the adversary
is not limited, but obtaining the information is made
harder (Xu et al., 2014). Randomization is a popular
approach to ensure that information presented is gar-
bled. A simple strategy for introducing randomization
into the classification process was proposed in (Barreno
et al., 2006), where it was suggested that randomness
be introduced in placing the boundary of the classifier.
This was made possible by using the confidence es-
timate given by a probabilistic classifier, to randomly
pick the class labels. While this increases the evasion
efforts necessary, it leads to a drop in accuracy in non
adversarial environments. A detailed analysis of this
tradeoff was presented in (Alabdulmohsin et al., 2014),
where a family of robust SVM models were learned and
used to increase reverse engineering effort.
The work in (Alabdulmohsin et al., 2014) showed
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that choosing a single classifier is a suboptimal strat-
egy, and that drawing classifiers from a distribution with
large variance can improve resistance to reverse engi-
neering, at little cost to the generalization performance
of the model. This idea has also been used in multiple
classifier systems, where a random classifier is selected
at any given time, from a bag of trained classifiers, to
perform the classification. The moving target approach
of (Colbaugh and Glass, 2012a), divides features into K
subsets and trains one classifier on each of these sub-
sets. One of these classifiers is chosen, according to a
scheduling policy, to perform the classification of an in-
coming sample x. It was shown that using a random
uniform scheduling policy provides the best protection
against an active adversary. This was formally proven
in (Vorobeychik and Li, 2014), where it was shown that
the optimal randomization strategy is to select classi-
fiers randomly with equal probabilities. In case of tar-
geted attacks, selecting uniformly was shown to be the
best strategy, whereas no randomization was the optimal
strategy in the face of indiscriminate attacks. Although
the ideas of (Colbaugh and Glass, 2012a) and (Vorob-
eychik and Li, 2014) are applicable to multiple classi-
fier systems, experimental results were shown only on
a set of two separately trained classifiers. Obtaining
multiple sets of classifiers, with high accuracy, was not
discussed. The work of (Biggio et al., 2008) uses the
multiple classification system formulation, by maintain-
ing a large set of classifier models and with randomiza-
tion being performed, by assigning a different weight-
ing scheme to the individual classifier’s prediction, for
every iteration. Experimentation was performed on the
Spamassassin dataset, by pre-selecting 100 weighting
schemes and allowing the classifier to choose any one
of them with equal probability, over different iterations.
This resulted in increased hardness of evasion of the
classifier under simulated attacks.
While randomization is a popular method for incor-
porating obscurity against evasion attacks, other meth-
ods have been suggested (Biggio et al., 2014a). Lim-
iting the feedback or providing incorrect feedback, to
combat probing attacks have been suggested in (Bar-
reno et al., 2006). Use of honeypots is another promis-
ing direction, wherein systems are designed for the sole
purpose of being attacked and thereby providing infor-
mation about attackers (Rowe et al., 2007). Use of so-
cial honeypots was suggested in (Lee et al., 2010), as
a means of collecting adversarial samples about social
spam. Bots which behave as humans are deployed in
the social cyber-space, specifically tested on Myspace
and Twitter data in (Lee et al., 2010), where they collect
information about potential spammers.
2.3. Reactive/Dynamic approaches for security of ma-
chine learning
Adversarial learning is a cyclic process, as described
in Figure 5 and in (Stein et al., 2011). Attacks are a
question of when and not if. Proactive measures of se-
curity delay the occurrence of attack, but eventually ev-
ery system is vulnerable to attack. These measures do
not provide any direction or solution for dealing with at-
tacks, and for fixing the system for future use after it has
been attacked. They are static one shot solutions, which
drop the ball as soon as a system is compromised. Reac-
tive system on the other hand, can deal with attacks after
their onset and aim to fix the system as soon as possible.
Work in (Barth et al., 2012) shows that, in the absence
of prior information about adversaries, reactive system
performs as good as a proactive security setting and is
a suggested security infrastructure for industrial scale
systems. Reactive systems can also ensure that attacks
are recognized and alerted, to take appropriate counter
measures.
Reactive methods have primarily been studied in the
domain of streaming data mining, where changes to the
data, called concept drift, are detected and the system is
adapted to maintain performance over time (Zˇliobaite˙,
2010). In these techniques, the system is agnostic to the
cause of change, and treats any degradation in its per-
formance in a similar way. As such, they are reactive
but not necessarily adversary aware (Dalvi et al., 2004).
The work in (Gama et al., 2014) summarizes the ma-
jor frameworks, methodologies and algorithms devel-
oped for handling concept drift. A trigger based concept
drift handling approach (Ditzler et al., 2015) consists of
two important components: a) A drift detection mod-
ule, and b) A drift adaptation module. The drift detec-
tion module is responsible for detecting changes in the
data and to signal further evaluation or adaptation based
on the detected changes. The adaptation module then
launches retraining of the system, by collecting new
labeled data and updating the model. Ensemble tech-
niques are a popular choice for drift handling systems,
as they allow modular retraining of the system (Sethi
et al., 2016). Ensemble methods have been proposed for
drift detection (Kuncheva, 2008) and for learning with
concept drift (Brzezinski and Stefanowski, 2014; Minku
and Yao, 2012).
At the confluence of concept drift and adversar-
ial learning, are the approaches of adversarial drift
(Kantchelian et al., 2013) and adversarial active learn-
ing (Miller et al., 2014). In (Kantchelian et al., 2013),
concept drift caused as a result of attacks, was dis-
cussed. The need for a responsive system, with the in-
tegration of traditional blacklists and whitelists, along-
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Figure 5: The Attack-Defense cycle between adversaries and system
designers (i.e., defenders).
side an ensemble of classifiers trained for every class
of malicious activity, was proposed. Isolation of mali-
cious campaign and techniques to ensure zero training
error, while still maintaining generalization, were ex-
tensions suggested for traditional classification systems
when used in an adversarial environment. The vulnera-
bilities of the labeling process were analyzed in (Miller
et al., 2014), which introduces the concept of adversar-
ial active learning. The Security oriented Active Learn-
ing Test bed (SALT) was proposed in (Miller et al.,
2014), to ensure effective drift management, human in-
tegration and querying strategies, in an adversarial envi-
ronment. Use of concept drift tracking within malware
families was analyzed in (Singh et al., 2012), to show
the temporal nature of adversarial samples. Metafea-
tures (higher order difficult to evade) were suggested, to
detect malicious activity. Use of an ensemble of clas-
sifier to detect spam emails was suggested in (Chinavle
et al., 2009), where mutual agreement of pairs of classi-
fiers in the ensemble was tracked and concept drift was
detected if the agreement drops. In the event of a drift
detection, poorly performing pairs of classifiers are se-
lected to be retrained. Extension of this work was pro-
posed in (Smutz and Stavrou, 2016), where the entire
ensemble’s disagreement score distribution was tracked.
A sudden increase in the overall disagreement was used
to indicate an attack on the system, without using ex-
ternal labeled data. Here, feature bagging (Bryll et al.,
2003) was found to be an effective ensemble strategy
to detect evasion attacks, such as mimicry and reverse
mimicry attacks, on the task of classifying malicious pdf
documents. These works provide initial ideas for using
machine learning in an adversarial environment, where
the data is streaming and the attacks-defense is a cyclic
never-ending process (Figure 5).
The reactive approaches have been well studied to-
wards an online never ending learning scheme. How-
ever, the current methods for reactive security do not
explicitly consider an adversarial environment, even
though a dynamic environment is considered. In ad-
versarial domains, concept drift (attacks) are a func-
tion of the deployed model itself, as reverse engineer-
ing is based on what model is learned in the first place
(Barreno et al., 2006). This information can be used
to design more suited reactive systems, in adversar-
ial domains. A combination of proactive and reactive
approaches are necessary when dealing with such do-
mains, as decisions made in the design phase could ulti-
mately make future steps down the pipeline easier. Fur-
ther research in this area will need a comprehensive look
at the learning process, with adversarial effects consid-
ered at every step of the process, towards an adversar-
ial aware dynamic learning system. This will require
newer metrics of measuring system performance, be-
yond accuracy and f-measure, towards metrics such as
recovery time and data separability (Mthembu and Mar-
wala, 2008), which are necessary for subsequent cycles
of the process. In this paper, we look at the Dynamic-
Adversarial nature of the security of machine learning.
To this end, we analyze the effect of various design
strategies, on the long term security of a system.
3. Adversarial Uncertainty - On the ability to react
to attacks in Dynamic - Adversarial environments
Understanding the impact of attacks and defense in
a cyclic environment, where a system is attacked and
needs to recover from it periodically, requires a new per-
spective on the problem and the metrics used for eval-
uating the different design strategies. The metric of at-
tack evasion rate (Lowd and Meek, 2005; Sethi et al.,
2017) is sufficient for evaluating robustness of models
to the onset of exploratory attacks, but it does not pro-
vide intuition about the effectiveness of strategies which
are designed for reacting to attacks in a dynamic en-
vironment. In this case, we need a metric which can
convey information about the ability to react to attacks
and continue operations, following the onset of attacks.
In this section, the idea of Adversarial Uncertainty is
introduced, to understand the impact of different clas-
sifier design strategies on the ability to react to attacks,
once they start to impact a system’s performance. The
motivation behind adversarial uncertainty is presented
in Section 3.1. The impact of the defender’s classi-
fier design on adversarial uncertainty, is presented us-
ing an illustrative example of binary feature valued data
in Section 3.2. A heuristic method to measure adver-
sarial uncertainty is presented in Section 3.3, by means
of introducing the Adversarial Margin Density (AMD)
measure. The ability of adversaries to utilize the avail-
able probe-able information, from the defender’s black
box model, in order to launch high confidence attacks, is
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demonstrated in Section 3.4 and Section 3.4.1. This is
done to analyze the impact of a determined adversary,
and to be able to design secure classifiers to counter
them.
3.1. Motivation
The defender extracts information about the predic-
tive problem, by analyzing and learning from the train-
ing data. The adversary on the other hand, obtains its in-
formation by probing the deployed black box model of
the defender. As such, there is a gap between the infor-
mation held by the two players. This is not a significant
concern when the adversary is aiming to only evade the
deployed model, as complete understanding of the fea-
ture space is often not needed to evade most robust clas-
sifier models. However, this information deficit/gap is
necessary to evaluate the impact an adversary can have
on the reactive capabilities of a defender. Adversarial
uncertainty refers to the uncertainty on the part of the
adversary, due to the unavailability of the original train-
ing data.
To understand the impact of adversarial uncertainty,
consider the following toy example: a 2-dimensional bi-
nary dataset, where the sample L(X1=1, X2=1) repre-
sents the Legitimate class training sample and M(X1=0,
X2=0) represents the Malicious class samples. A model
trained as C : X1 ∨ X2 provides generalization capabil-
ities, by allowing (0,1) and (1,0) to be considered as le-
gitimate samples at test time. In this case, an adversary
looking to evade C, can pick one of the following three
attack samples at test time: (1,0), (0,1), (1,1). While any
of these samples will lead to a successful evasion on the
adversary’s part, only one is truly devastating for a reac-
tive system. The adversarial sample (1,1) will make the
defender’s model ineffective, as it completely mimics
the training sample L. However, in this case, the prob-
ability of selecting this sample is 1/3, as an adversary
is not certain about the exact impact of the features X1
and X2, on C. This uncertainty on the part of the adver-
sary is referred to as adversarial uncertainty. In this ex-
ample, adversarial uncertainty will enable the defender
to recover from attacks 2/3 times, as the attack sample
(1,0) can be thwarted by an updated model C′ : X2, and
the sample (0,1) can be thwarted by the model C′ : X1.
The attack sample (1,1) is an example of a data nulli-
fication attack (Kantchelian et al., 2013). Data nullifica-
tion leaves the defender unable to use the same training
data, to continue operating in a dynamic environment.
An illustration of data nullification attacks on numer-
ical data spaces is shown in Figure 6. In this figure,
the attacks samples generated, overlap with the origi-
nal space of legitimate data samples. As such, the de-
Figure 6: Illustration of data nullification attacks on the space of le-
gitimate samples (blue).
fender will be unable to train a high quality classifica-
tion model, which can effectively separate the two class
of samples, while using the existing set of features. Re-
covering from data nullification attacks will require the
defender to generate additional features and collect new
training data, both of which are time taking and expen-
sive operations. Also, such attacks will be harder to de-
tect via unsupervised techniques (Sethi and Kantardzic,
2017b), because the legitimate and the attack samples
have a high degree of similarity and proximity, in the
feature space. It is therefore required to ward of data
nullification attacks, to be able to effectively detect and
recover from attacks. Adversarial uncertainty provides
a heuristic indication of the inability of the adversary, to
deduce with confidence the exact impact of the various
features on the prediction problem. A high adversar-
ial uncertainty will lead to a lower probability of a data
nullification attack.
From a dynamic data perspective, the ability to detect
attacks and being able to retrain the classifier, are impor-
tant characteristics of the system. This is possible only
if the original legitimate training data is not corrupted by
an adversary at test time (i.e., data nullification attacks
are prevented). Data nullification attacks are possible
if an adversary is able to simultaneously and success-
fully reverse engineer the impact of the entire feature
set, on the defender’s classification model. This is a re-
sult of an adversary’s confidence in the impact of the
different features on the prediction task, which it ob-
tains via exploration of the deployed black box model.
A highly confident adversary can not only evade the de-
ployed classifier, but can also avoid detection by unsu-
pervised distribution tracking methodologies (Sethi and
Kantardzic, 2017b). Thus, it is essential to evaluate the
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impact of the various defender strategies, on their ability
to ensure that they do not leak excessive information to
an adversary (i.e., their ability to ensure high adversarial
uncertainty).
3.2. Impact of classifier design on adversarial uncer-
tainty
Adversarial activity and capabilities are a function
of the deployed black box classifier, which is being
evaded. The adversary’s perception of the prediction
space is directed by the feedback on probes submitted
to the defender’s model. As such, the defender’s clas-
sifier design has a certain degree of control in defin-
ing the range of attacks, that can be launched against
it. Classifier design strategies range from restrictive
one class classifiers (Salem et al., 2008; Onoda and Ki-
uchi, 2012), to robust majority voted classifier (Glober-
son and Roweis, 2006; Liu et al., 2012), and random-
ization based feature bagged ensembles (Colbaugh and
Glass, 2012a; Biggio et al., 2008). From an adversarial
perspective, the selection of classifier learning strategies
can have a significant impact on adversarial uncertainty,
and on the hardness of evasion. The impact of popular
classifier design strategies, based on research directions
in security of machine learning, is illustrated here us-
ing an example of a N-dimensional binary feature space.
We consider the training dataset to be comprised of one
Legitimate class sample L(1,1,...(N features),1) and one
Malicious class sample M(0,0, ....(N features),0). As
such, the features 1 to N are all informative in discrim-
inating between the two classes of samples. The effec-
tive usage of this orthogonal information, leads to the
various design strategies, as shown in Table 1. Since
this is meant to be an illustrative example, we consider
the impact of these designs against a random probing
based attack strategy, where the attacker tries different
permutations of the N binary variables, to understand
the behavior of the black box classifier.
The Simple model strategy of Table 1, represents a
classifier design which emphasizes feature reduction in
its learning phase. An example of such a classifier
is a C4.5 Decision tree (Quinlan, 1993) or a Linear
SVM with L1-regularization penalty (Chang and Lin,
2011), which gravitate towards simpler model represen-
tations. A representative model in this case, is given by
C : Xi = 1, as the learned classification rule. The prob-
ability that a randomly generated N-dimensional probe
sample will evade C is 0.5, as the prediction space is
divided into two halves, on this feature Xi. The adver-
sarial certainty (Table 1) refers to the confidence that an
adversary has about the defender’s training data, given
that an attack sample is successful in evading C. In the
case of the simple model, the adversary is fairly uncer-
tain, as the training data sample L could be any one of
the 2N−1 probe samples, which provide successful eva-
sion.
The Complex models rely on aggregating feature in-
formation, to make the learned models more complex
(i.e., have more coefficients and important features).
The one class classifier strategy is a complex model
and comes in two flavors: a restrictive boundary around
the legitimate training data samples, and a restrictive
boundary around the malicious training data samples.
In the former case, the model is the hardest to evade,
as an adversary will need to simultaneously evade all N
features, to gain access to the system. This provides ad-
ditional security from attack onset, by reducing evasion
probability to 1 in 2N . However, it also leads to an ad-
versarial certainty of 100%, implying that any success-
ful attack will lead to a data nullification and subsequent
inability of the defender to recover from such attacks.
Thus, as opposed to common belief in cybersecurity
(Onoda and Kiuchi, 2012), a more restrictive classifiers
could be a bad strategy, when considering a dynamic
and adversarial environment. The one class model on
the set of malicious training data, represents the other
end of the spectrum, where a boundary is drawn around
the malicious class samples. This model makes evasion
easier, but ensures high adversarial uncertainty. This is
also undesirable, as evasion can be performed by chang-
ing any of the N features. It could however benefit de-
fenders facing multiple disjoint adversaries (Kantche-
lian et al., 2013; Sculley et al., 2011).
A popular design strategy in adversarial domains, fo-
cuses on integrating multiple orthogonal feature space
information to make a complex model, which is robust
to changes in a subset of the features (Biggio et al.,
2008, 2010a,b). A feature bagging ensemble, which
uses majority voting on its component model’s predic-
tions, is a popular choice in this category. This model
is resilient to attacks which affect only a few features
at any given time. Most robust learning strategies were
evaluated against a targeted exploration attack, where
the adversary starts with a predetermined attack sam-
ple and aims to minimally alter it, so as to evade the
classifier C. By measuring adversarial cost in terms
of the number of features which need evasion, the effi-
cacy of feature bagged models was demonstrated (Lowd
and Meek, 2005), as robust models by design will re-
quire a majority of the features to be modified, for a
successful evasion. This reasoning is not valid for the
case of an indiscriminate exploratory attack, where an
adversary is interested in generating any sample which
evades C without any predefined set of attack samples
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Table 1: Impact of classifier design on evasion probability and adversarial certainty.
Classifier
Model (C)
Model
representation
Evasion
probability
Adversarial
Certainty
Simple model
(e.g., C4.5 Decision tree) Xi = 1 2
N−1/2N = 1/2 1/2N−1
Complex model -
One class Legitimate
∧
i∈N Xi = 1 1/2N 1/1=1
Complex model -
One class Malicious
∨
i∈N Xi = 1 (2N − 1)/2N 1/(2N − 1)
Complex model - Feature bagged
robust model (e.g., random subspace
majority voted ensemble)
∨
s⊂N
∧
i∈s Xi = 1
∑N
i= N2 +1
(
N
i
)
/2N = 1/2∗ 1/2N−1
Randomized model - Feature bagged
robust model with majority voting and
random selection
∧
i∈s Xi = 1; s ⊂ N 1/2N/2 1/2(N/2)
∗∑N
i= N2 +1
(
N
i
)
=
∑N
i=0
(
N
i
)
/2, i f N is even = 2N/2 = 2N−1
(Sethi et al., 2017). In this setting, the impact of feature
bagged ensemble is similar to that of a simple model, as
seen from the evasion probability and adversarial cer-
tainty computations of Table 1.
An additional design strategy, relies on randomness
to provide protection. By training models on multiple
different subspace of the data and then randomly choos-
ing one of the models to provide the prediction at any
given time, these model aims to mislead attackers, by
obscuring the feedback from the black box model C.
Although this strategy has a higher perceived evasion re-
sistance (Table 1), security through obscurity has shown
to be ineffective when faced with indiscriminate probing
based attacks (Vorobeychik and Li, 2014).
3.3. Using Adversarial Margin Density (AMD) to ap-
proximate adversarial uncertainty
The use of adversarial certainty in Table 1, was il-
lustrated by using a random probing attack on a binary
feature space. Here, the idea of adversarial uncertainty
is expanded and a methodology for its computation and
usage is presented, for empirical evaluation.
Adversarial uncertainty is essentially the uncertainty
on the adversary’s part, due to the non availability of the
original training dataset. For the task of classification,
this uncertainty refers to the inability of the adversary to
successfully reverse engineer the impact of all the im-
portant features, on the prediction task. We measure
this uncertainty using the notion of Adversarial Mar-
gin Density (AMD), as defined below. The concept of
margin density was first introduced in (Sethi and Kan-
tardzic, 2015, 2017b), where it was used to measure the
uncertainty in data samples, as a method to detect drifts
from unlabeled data. It was shown that robust classi-
fiers defined regions of uncertainties (called margins or
blindspots), where samples fall as a result of partial fea-
ture space disagreement. We extend this notion to the
domain of adversarial evaluation, by using it to define
adversarial uncertainty. An attacker that impacts only a
minimal set of feature, so as to be sufficient to evade the
defender’s classifier C, will lead to a large margin den-
sity. This is due to the increased disagreement between
orthogonal models, trained from the original training
dataset. Conversely, an attacker with a low margin den-
sity is indicative of one who was successful in evading a
large set of informative features. To this end, the notion
of Adversarial Margin Density (AMD) is defined here,
to capture adversarial uncertainty on the set of evaded
features.
Definition 3.1. Adversarial Margin Density (AMD):
The expected number of successful attack samples (at-
tack samples classified by the defender as Legitimate),
which fall within the defender’s margin (i.e., the region
of critical uncertainty), defined by a robust classifier
(one that distributes feature weights) on the training
data.
The definition of AMD highlights the following two
concepts: a) The AMD is computed only on the attack
samples which successfully evade the classifier C, and
b) We measure only the region of critical uncertainty
(margin/blindspots), predefined for a classifier trained
on the original training data. The AMD measures the
uncertainty by quantifying the attack samples which
evade the classifier C, but do not have high certainty
about the entire feature space. This is demonstrated in
Figure 7, where the adversarial margin is given by the
region of space where the defender C is evaded, but the
feature X2 is still not successfully reverse engineered
by the adversary. This causes the attacks to fall within
blindspots of a robust classifier (i.e., one that distributes
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Figure 7: Illustration of adversarial margin. It is given by the region
of space which leads to evasion of defender’s classifier C, but does not
lead to evasion of all the informative features.
feature weights). For an attack to have a low uncer-
tainty, it will have to avoid falling in the blindspots,
which is possible only if an attacker can successfully
evade a significant portion of the feature space (given
by critical uncertainty), simultaneously.
The idea behind the AMD is presented in Defini-
tion 3.1. An implementation methodology which can
be used to compute AMD is presented next. A random
subspace ensemble is considered for defining the robust
classifier, over the training dataset, as this classifier is
general in its design and does not make assumptions
about usage of any specific classifier type (Ho, 1998).
The AMD is computed using Equation 2.
AMD =
∑
S E(x)
|x| ; ∀x ∈ XAttack : C(x) is Legitimate
where,
S E(x) =
1, i f
∣∣∣pE(yLegitimate|x) − pE(yMalicious|x)∣∣∣ ≤ θMargin
0, otherwise
(2)
The AMD is measured only on the attack samples
(XAttack) which successfully evade the defender’s clas-
sifier C, at test time. These set of samples are evaluated
to determine if they fall within the region of critical un-
certainty given by the parameter θMargin. By adjusting
the parameter, the sensitivity of measurements and tol-
erance for adversarial activity, can be tuned. A value
of 0.5 is typically considered effective for most sce-
narios (Sethi and Kantardzic, 2017b). Samples falling
in this region of high disagreement (given by param-
eter θMargin) are considered to be cases where there is
critical uncertainty between the constituent models of
the ensemble. Since the ensemble is trained as a fea-
ture bagged model, this disagreement is due to differ-
ent feature value distributions, than the benign training
samples, caused by adversarial uncertainty. The ensem-
ble E is taken to be a random subspace ensemble. In
the experimentation here, we consider a feature bagged
ensemble of 50 base Linear-SVM models, each with
50% of the total features, randomly picked. In Equa-
tion 2, pE(y|x) is obtained via majority voting on the
constituent models, and represents disagreement scores
for each sample x. The AMD is always a ratio between
0 and 1, and a higher value indicates a high adversarial
uncertainty. By extension, a higher AMD also indicates
an increased ease of unsupervised detection, and subse-
quent recovery from attacks.
3.4. Evaluating dynamic effects of evasion by a sophis-
ticated adversary
To fully understand the capabilities of an adversary, it
is necessary to assume that we are facing a strong adver-
sary, who uses all information and tools at its disposal.
To this end, we extend the Anchor Points(AP) attack
framework of (Sethi et al., 2017), to simulate a high im-
pact sophisticated adversary, which utilizes its probing
ability to generate a high confidence attack on the de-
fender’s model. While the framework of (Sethi et al.,
2017) was developed as a proof of concept, to demon-
strate the vulnerability of classifiers to evasion attacks,
the proposed attack in this section focuses on the ability
of an attacker to not only evade but also cause long term
damages, by preventing attacks from being detected or
recovered from. Attacks of high adversarial certainty
are simulated, which are capable of using probed data
to fall outside the margins of the defender. This exten-
sion of the AP framework, will allow for testing against
a sophisticated adversary, and will enable us to better
understand the severity of exploratory attacks possible
at test time. Since this extension maintains the origi-
nal black box assumptions of the defender’s model, it
provides for analyzing the impact of severe exploratory
attacks, which are possible to carry out against a classi-
fier, by an adversary.
The proposed extension to the AP framework is de-
picted in Figure 8. Specifically, the filter strategy is de-
veloped as an extension to the Anchor Points attacks
(AP) of (Sethi et al., 2017). The anchor points explo-
ration samples obtained are first sent to a filter phase,
where the low confidence samples are eliminated, be-
fore the exploitation phase starts. This filtering leads to
a reduced size of exploration samples, for which the ad-
versary has high confidence that they do not fall in the
defender’s margins. This approach is called the Anchor
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Figure 8: AP based evasion attack framework, with a high confidence
filter phase.
Points - High Confidence (AP-HC) strategy, and it is de-
veloped as a wrapper over the AP framework, making it
easy for extension to other data driven attack strategies
as well. The AP-HC strategy will simulate adversaries
who are capable of utilizing all the probe-able informa-
tion, to launch attacks which generate low Adversarial
Margin Density (AMD), on the defender’s part.
In the filtering phase of the Figure 8, the adversary re-
lies on stitching together information made available by
the defender’s black box, to launch attacks which evade
a large number of features simultaneously. The adver-
sary does so by integrating information learned in the
exploration phase, about the impact of different subsets
of features, on the prediction outcome. It then filters out
samples which are good for evasion, but only result in
evading a small subset of features. This will result in an
attack exploitation, which would provide to high adver-
sarial certainty. The idea is illustrated in Figure 9, on a
2D synthetic dataset. In this example, there are two sets
of features X1 and X2, both of which are informative
for the classification task, as X1 > 0.5 or X2 > 0.5 both
lead to the high quality defender models. Consider the
defender’s model to be ′X1 > 0.5 ∨ X2 > 0.5′, which
leads to an adversarial uncertainty of 1/3, since the train-
ing data could be in any of the 3 quadrants where the
samples are perceived as Legitimate. A naive adver-
sary using the AP framework, can launch an attack us-
ing samples where atleast one of the two feature X1 or
X2 is greater than 0.5. However, an adversary using the
high confidence filter attack will combine this orthogo-
nal information and launch attack samples only if both
conditions are satisfied (i.e., X1 > 0.5 and X2 > 0.5). In
doing so, the adversary is learning the orthogonal infor-
mation about the prediction landscape and aggregating
this information to avoid detection by the defender.
The high confidence filtering strategy illustrated in
Figure 9, where the initial explored samples for the AP
attacks (b), are filtered using the aforementioned infor-
mation aggregation technique, to generate a high con-
fidence set of exploration samples (c). The adversary
does so by using the exploration samples in b), to train
orthogonal models, and admit only those samples which
have high consensus (low uncertainty), based on the
trained model. The filtered exploration samples are then
used in the exploitation phase, and as can be seen in Fig-
ure 9, these attacks have an AMD of 0, as none of the
attack samples fall inside the margin of the classifier.
In the analysis presented in Table 1, it was shown that
complex feature bagged ensembles models have a low
adversarial certainty (1/2N−1, for N dimensional binary
feature space). This made it more secure in dynamic en-
vironments, when compared to the restrictive one class
classifier model, where the adversarial certainty was 1.
However, similar to a one class classifier, the robust en-
semble model also makes a majority of the information
available, to be probed by a patient adversary, as demon-
strated in Figure 9. This information is not directly
available (as in the case of a one class classifier, where
evasion leads to an adversarial uncertainty of 0), and
does not directly lead an adversary to the space of train-
ing data. However, the AP-HC filtering step can cause
the adversary to stitch together information made avail-
able by such ensemble models, to launch a potent attack
which could leave the defender helpless. A generic ap-
proach to extend the intuition of Figure 9, to high di-
mensional spaces, is presented in the following section.
3.4.1. The Anchor Points - High Confidence (AP-HC)
approach
The AP-HC attack strategy is presented in Algo-
rithm 1. The algorithm receives the exploration sam-
ples from the AP framework, and then uses the filtering
approach of Figure 9, to clear out samples of low confi-
dence. The adversary does so by training a robust clas-
sifier, such as a random subspace ensemble, from the
probed exploration samples. The trained model is then
used to identify samples of low confidence, as these are
the ones which have low consensus among the feature
bagged ensemble’s models. The resulting set of filtered
exploration samples DExplore−HC , from Algorithm 1, is
then used in the exploitation phase of the AP frame-
work, to launch the attacks. This methodology is im-
plemented completely on the adversary’s side, while
maintaining the same black box assumption about the
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Figure 9: Reducing adversarial uncertainty via filtering, in anchor points attacks. After the exploration phase in b), the adversary trains models on
individual feature subspaces (X1 and X2). It then aggregates this information to clean out samples in low confidence areas (C:X1, C:X2). The
final set of filtered high confidence samples are shown in d).
Algorithm 1: AP based high confidence filter at-
tacks (AP-HC).
Input : Exploration Samples from AP framework
- DExplore, Filter threshold
θAdversary con f idence
Output: High confidence exploration samples
DExplore−HC
1 E← Train random subspace samples from DExplore
2 DExplore−HC = ∅
3 for sample in DExplore do
4 if |pE(yLegitimate|sample) −
pE(yMalicious|sample)| ≥ θAdversary con f idence
then
5 DExplore−HC ∪ sample
6 return DExplore−HC
defender, as presented by the AP framework in (Sethi
et al., 2017). As such, it serves as a methodology for
thorough analysis of adversarial capabilities, to better
design secure machine learning frameworks. The pur-
pose of the AP-HC attack approach is to highlight the
effects of making excessive information available to the
adversary, and the resulting space of possible attacks
which could be launched by it, using purely data driven
methodologies.
The parameter θAdversary con f idence, controls the fil-
tering operation in Algorithm 1. Since an adver-
sary is interested only in high confidence attack sam-
ples, we consider a high confidence threshold of
θAdversary con f idence=0.8. A higher confidence threshold
will allow for more stringent filtering of samples. This
heuristic filtering approach will be used to demonstrate
the capabilities of an adversary to evade detection, by
gaining more certainty about the location of the training
data. This approach will be used to highlight innate vul-
nerabilities in seemingly secure designs, such as the ro-
bust feature bagged ensemble strategy, and will be used
for thorough analysis of the impact of classifier design
on adversarial capability.
4. Experimental evaluation and analysis
In this section, the impact of different classifier de-
sign strategies, on adversarial capabilities, is evaluated.
Moving beyond accuracy, the effects of attacks from a
dynamic-adversarial perspective, is analyzed. The idea
of adversarial margin density is considered, to account
for detect-ability and retrain-ability from attacks. The
adversary is considered to be capable of using machine
learning to meet its needs. In Section 4.1, the protocol
and setup of experiments performed in this section, is
presented. Effect of using a restrictive one class model
for the defender is presented in Section 4.2. Impact of
using a robust feature bagged ensemble and that of using
randomization based models in presented in Section 4.3
and Section 4.4, respectively. Discussion and analysis
is presented in Section 4.5.
4.1. Experimental setup and protocol
The basic Anchor Points framework of (Sethi et al.,
2017), is considered for generating attacks on the de-
fender’s black box model, with the modifications pre-
sented in Section 3.4.1. The parameters of the AP
attacks are taken without any modifications, to en-
sure consistent analysis and extension of the attack
paradigms. The defender is considered to be a black
box by the adversary, with no information about its in-
ternal working available. The only interaction the at-
tacker has with the defender, is by means of submitting
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probe samples, and receiving tacit Accept/Reject feed-
back on them.
Adversarial margin density proposed in Section 3.3,
is used for evaluating uncertainty of the attacks. A
θMargin=0.5, for measuring the AMD (as motivated by
analysis in (Sethi and Kantardzic, 2017b)), is consid-
ered. A random subspace model with 50 Linear SVMs
(regularization constant c=1, and 50% of the features in
each model), is taken for the AMD computation. Also,
the effects of filtering by an adversary is evaluated in
this section, with a θAdversary con f idence=0.8. A random
subspace model with 50 Linear SVMs (regularization
constant c=10, and 50% of the features in each model),
is chosen for the filtering task. A high regularization
constant ensures that the models do not overfit to the
exploration samples, as the adversary’s goal is not to fit
the model to the explored samples, but to learn from it
about the region of high confidence. This also makes
it more robust to black box feedback noise and stray
probes.
Description of datasets used for evaluation is pre-
sented in Table 2. The synthetic datasets is a 10 dimen-
sional dataset, with two classes. The Legitimate class
is normally distributed with a µ=0.75 and σ=0.05, and
the Malicious class is centered at µ=0.25 and σ=0.05,
across all 10 dimensions. This datasets provides for
controlled experimentation and analysis, by exhibiting
10 informative features. The CAPTCHA dataset is
taken from (DSouza, 2014), and it represents the task
of classifying mouse movement data for humans and
bots, for the task of behavioral authentication. The
phishing dataset is taken from (Lichman, 2013), and it
represents characteristics for malicious and benign web
pages. The digits dataset (Lichman, 2013) was taken
to represent a standard classification task. The multidi-
mensional dataset was reduced to a binary class problem
with the class 1 and 7 taken for the Digits17 dataset, and
the class 0 and 8 taken for the Digits08 dataset, respec-
tively. In all datasets, the class 0 was considered to rep-
resent the Legitimate and 1 was taken as the Malicious
class. For Digits17, the class 7 is considered to be Le-
gitimate, and for the Digits08, class 0 is considered Le-
gitimate. The data was normalized to the range of [0,1],
using min-max normalization, and the features were re-
duced to a numeric/binary type. The records were shuf-
fled, to eliminate stray effects of concept drifts within
them. All experiments are repeated 30 times and aver-
age values are reported. The experiments are performed
using python and the scikit-learn machine learning li-
brary (Pedregosa et al., 2011).
Table 2: Description of datasets used for experimentation.
Dataset #Instances #Features
Synthetic 500 10
CAPTCHA 1886 26
Phishing 11055 46
Digits08 1499 16
Digits17 1557 16
4.2. Analyzing effects of using a restrictive one-class
classifier for the defender’s model
In adversarial domains, restricting the space of sam-
ples classified as Legitimate, is considered an effective
defense strategy (Onoda and Kiuchi, 2012; Biggio et al.,
2015). By tightly restricting what data points are qual-
ified as legitimate, the ability of random probing based
attacks is significantly reduced. This is a consequence
of the reduced probe-able feature space area, as shown
in Figure 10, where a one class classifier is trained on
the set of legitimate training data points. The feedback
obtained from the defender’s model, by probing the fea-
ture space, is shown. The significantly smaller area of
the blue feedback (Figure 10), is what makes one class
classifiers harder to probe and reverse engineer. How-
ever, the one class classifier has limitation, which make
them unsuitable for an adversarial domain. Firstly, a
one class classifier sacrifices generalization ability and
it is not always possible to train an accurate model over
the available training data (Biggio et al., 2015). Sec-
ondly, as seen in our analysis in Table 1, a one class
classifier could cause high adversarial certainty, mak-
ing attack detection and recovery difficult. Most works
on the security of classifiers advocate inclusion of all
orthogonal information, to make the system more re-
strictive and therefore more secure (Onoda and Kiuchi,
2012; Biggio et al., 2015; Papernot et al., 2016c; Rndic
and Laskov, 2014; Wang, 2015; Biggio et al., 2010a).
However, these works approach the security of the sys-
tem from a static perspective. Evaluating a one class
classifier provides valuable insights into the inefficacy
of using restrictive models, in a dynamic adversarial en-
vironment. While recent works present various novel
ideas for integrating feature information (Biggio et al.,
2015; Woz´niak et al., 2014), a one-class classifier serves
as an ideal representative approach, in which all infor-
mation across all features is used in securing the system.
In a dynamic environment, it is necessary to main-
tain adversarial uncertainty, so as to ensure that attacks
can be recovered from. A one-class classifier, being
overly restrictive, leads an attacker directly to the space
of the legitimate training data. Although this classi-
14
Figure 10: Illustration of prediction landscape of a one-class classifier.
Smaller area of the legitimate samples indicate the resilience against
probing based attacks.
fier design makes the adversary expend greater effort to
evade the system, once evaded the attacks are indistin-
guishable from the benign traffic entering the system.
This is illustrated in case of a 2D synthetic data in Fig-
ure 11. Here, the anchor points attack is used to gen-
erate attacks, on two different classifier designs: a) A
one class classifier on the legitimate training data (SVM
with parameters: ν=0.1, RBF kernel and γ=0.1), and b)
A two class linear classifier model (Linear SVM with
L2-regularization, c=1). The attack used 20 samples for
exploration (BExplore) and generated 40 attack samples,
in each case (Sethi and Kantardzic, 2017a). It is seen
in Figure 11, that the attack leads to a large number of
samples occupying the same region as that of the legit-
imate samples, in case of the restrictive one class de-
fender model (Figure 11a)). This will cause problems
in a dynamic environment, as retraining to thwart at-
tacks is close to impossible in this case. Also, detect-
ing such attacks is difficult, due to the increased simi-
larity with benign input. In case of the two class model
(Figure 11b)), a larger data space is perceived as legiti-
mate, due to the generalization provided by these mod-
els, leading to attacks which are farther from the train-
ing data space. This illustrates the ability of classifier
model designs, to influence the severity of attacks on
the system, and to cause higher adversarial uncertainty.
Experimental evaluation of the synthetic 2D dataset,
and two additional datasets from Table 2, is presented
in Table 3. Here, the metric of Effective Attack Rate
(EAR) is taken to measure the vulnerability of the the
defender’s model, to anchor points attacks. EAR mea-
sures the percentage of attack samples which are incor-
rectly classified by the defender’s classifier model (Sethi
et al., 2017). Additionally the following two metrics are
introduced, to measure the effectiveness of attacks in a
dynamic environment - Data Leakage and the Adver-
sarial Margin Density (AMD). Adversarial margin den-
sity was introduced in Section 3.3, as a measure for ap-
proximating adversarial uncertainty over the defender’s
(a) Use of a one class classifier by the defender causes reduced at-
tack rate, but leads to increased training data corruption and leak-
age.
(b) Two class classifiers ensures less data leakage, but makes eva-
sion easier.
Figure 11: Illustration of AP attacks on a synthetic 2D dataset, using
a restrictive one class classifier and a generalized two class classifiers,
for the defender’s model.
training data. Data leakage is introduced here as an ad-
hoc metric for evaluating the loss of private data, in a
one class classification setting. Data leakage is mea-
sured by developing a one class classifier on the space
of legitimate training samples, and then measuring the
number of attack samples which are incorrectly classi-
fied by this classifier. Data leak is used to measure the
proximity of the attack samples, to the original space
of legitimate training samples, with a large value indi-
cating the ability of the adversary to closely mimic the
legitimate samples. A one class SVM model (parame-
ters: ν=0.1, RBF kernel, γ=0.1), is used to measure the
data leakage metric. The metrics were computed for the
case of the one class and the two class defender’s model,
as shown in Table 3.
The Effective Attack Rate (EAR), is significantly
lower for the one class classifier (∆=0.46 on average,
from Table 3). This is a result of the stricter criterion for
inclusion into the legitimate space, as imposed by the
complex and restrictive classifier boundary. However,
this comes at the cost of an increased possibility of data
leakage and lower adversarial uncertainty. From Ta-
ble 3, it can be seen that the data leak increases sharply
for the one class classifier (∆=0.49, on average), as the
restrictive nature of the classifiers leads the adversary to
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Table 3: Results of experimentation on one-class and two-class defender models. Training accuracy, Effective Attack Rate (EAR), Data Leakage
(DL) and Adversarial Margin Density (AMD), are presented for comparison.
Dataset Defender’s Model
Training
Accuracy EAR Data Leak
Adversarial Margin
Density (AMD)
Synthetic
(2 features)
Restrictive one class 97.4 0.56 0.67 0
Robust two class 100 0.89 0 0.85
Synthetic
(10 features)
Restrictive one class 97.6 0.04 0.67 0
Robust two class 100 0.99 0.1 0.28
CAPTCHA Restrictive one class 96.4 0.88 0.23 0Robust two class 100 0.99 0.01 0.14
the training data samples. This causes problems with re-
training, loss of privacy, loss of clean training data, and
issues with unsupervised attack detection. The data leak
metric provides a heuristic way to measure the severity
of data nullification attacks. However, the data leak met-
ric is difficult to compute for high dimensional datasets,
due to the inability to train an accurate one class classi-
fier, which is needed to measure the data leakage. For
this reason the other datasets of Table 2, are not used
for the analysis in this section. Also, these datasets pro-
vided low training data accuracy when using a one class
classifier, making it unsuitable as a choice for the de-
fender’s model. Going forward, the adversarial margin
density metric will be used, to indicate the strategic ad-
vantage of the defender over the adversary, in detecting
attacks and relearning from them.
The adversarial margin density (AMD) is more gen-
eral in its applicability, when compared to the data leak
measure, and provides a way to indirectly measure ad-
versarial uncertainty and the severity of attacks in dy-
namic environments. From Table 3, it is seen that the
AMD is 0 for all 3 datasets, when using a one-class de-
fender model. This is due to the increased confidence
in the location of the training data, once the restric-
tive model is evaded. Although the one class classi-
fier is secure, as it ensures a low EAR, it leaves the
defender helpless once an attack starts. As such, design-
ing for a dynamic environment requires forethought on
the defender’s part. The experimentation in this section
was presented for illustrating the ill effects of using an
overly restrictive model for the defender, and the need
to reevaluate the notion of security which relies on gen-
erating complex learning models.
4.3. Analyzing effects of using a robust feature-bagged
ensemble for the defender’s model
Robust models, which advocate complex models in-
volving a large number of informative features, are
considered to be effective in safeguarding against tar-
geted exploratory attacks (Papernot et al., 2016c; Rndic
and Laskov, 2014; Wang, 2015; Biggio et al., 2010a,b;
Woz´niak et al., 2014; Stevens and Lowd, 2013). In
these attacks, the adversary starts with a predefined set
of attack samples, and intends to minimally modify it,
so as to evade the defender. Robust models require
that a majority of the feature values be mimicked by
the adversary, increasing the cost and effort needed to
carry out attacks. However, in the case of an indis-
criminate exploratory attacks (Sethi et al., 2017), this
same line of reasoning is not valid, as an attacker is
interested in any sample that causes evasion. In these
attacks, the ease of evasion is given by the effective
space of prediction, which is recognized as Legitimate
by the defender. This is because an adversary launch-
ing indiscriminate attacks does so by probing the black
box model to find samples which would be classified
as legitimate. A robust model, such as a Linear SVM
with L2-regularization, incorporates information con-
veyed by a majority of the features, from the training
dataset, into the learned model. It does so to make
a model robust to stray changes, and also to generate
wide generalization margins, for better test time predic-
tive performance. In an adversarial environment, the
effective area of legitimate samples conveyed by a ro-
bust model, is similar to that of a simple model (which
aims at reducing the number of features in the model),
as shown in Figure 12. In Figure 12, a non robust linear
SVM (with L1-regularization) is considered alongside
a robust linear SVM (with L2-regularization). The ef-
fective area of legitimate samples (blue) is the same in
both cases. This makes the two strategies equivalent in
terms of securing against indiscriminate probing based
evasion attacks.
The equivalence of robust and non robust models, to
indiscriminate probing attacks, is further analyzed by
evaluating on 5 datasets in Table 4. The Anchor Points
attacks (AP), are performed on two sets of classifiers: a)
A robust classifier - Random subspace ensemble with 50
linear SVMs (L1-regularized, each with 50% of the fea-
tures randomly selected), and b) A non robust classifier-
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Figure 12: Illustration of prediction landscape using simple and ro-
bust models, on 2D synthetic data. Left- Initial training data, of the
defender. Center- L1-regularized linear SVM model for the defender
(Non robust). Right- L2-regularized linear SVM model for the de-
fender (robust).
Single linear SVM (with L1-regularization). The effect
of these strategies on the adversarial outcome is pre-
sented in Table 4. The Effective Attack Rate (EAR) is
seen to be similar for the two cases (∆=0.01, on aver-
age). This demonstrates the equivalence in effects of
the two strategies, when it comes to securing against
probing based attacks.
Based on the analysis on a binary feature space in
Table 1, it was deduced that simple models behave sim-
ilar to robust models, when attacks are of an indiscrim-
inate nature, as both result in the same adversarial cer-
tainty of 1/2N−1. From the same analysis, it was de-
duced that robust models are better than one-class clas-
sifiers, in maintaining adversarial uncertainty. The in-
tuition behind this was that the increased generaliza-
tion of robust models will create uncertainty regard-
ing the exact location of the training data, and the im-
pact of various feature subspaces on the prediction task.
However, this intuition relied on the assumption of a
naive adversary, whose primary aim is to evade the sys-
tem only. The proposed high confidence filtering attack
strategy (AP-HC) of Section 3.4, provides a way to sim-
ulate a sophisticated adversary, who is capable of uti-
lizing all the probe-able information to launch attacks
of high certainty. The result of using this attack strat-
egy on the robust classifier model is presented in Ta-
ble 4. It is seen that the AMD for the robust classifier
significantly reduces, when faced with the high confi-
dence attack. In case of the CAPTCHA dataset and
the Synthetic dataset, the adversarial activity will go to-
tally unnoticed, while in case of other datasets, a signif-
icant drop in the AMD is observed (∆=0.38, on aver-
age over all datasets). An important observation comes
from the fact that the filtering operation was performed
completely on the adversary’s side, without any help or
information from the defender’s model. The adversary
starts off with the goal of admitting only the most con-
fident exploration samples, and in doing so, it makes it
Table 4: Results of Anchor Points (AP) attacks and Anchor Points
– High Confidence (AP-HC) attacks, on the Effective Attack Rate
(EAR) and the Adversarial Margin Density(AMD).
Dataset TrainingAccuracy
EAR AMD
AP
Attacks
AP-HC
Attacks
AP
Attacks
AP-HC
Attacks
Synthetic 100 0.98 0.999 0.28 0.01
CAPTCHA 100 0.996 0.999 0.19 0.002
Phishing 93.1 0.978 0.999 0.62 0.19
Digits08 97.1 0.928 0.999 0.73 0.22
Digits17 99.5 0.965 0.999 0.66 0.16
difficult for the defender to detect or stop it.
The effectiveness of the high confidence attacks, is
due to the availability of all information, to be probed by
a sophisticated adversary. The majority voting scheme
of the robust ensemble, is reverse engineered by stitch-
ing together orthogonal subsets of feature information,
to generate attacks which closely mimic the legitimate
samples. As such, the robust ensemble methodologies
behave similar to one-class classifiers, by being vulner-
able to low adversarial uncertainty. Both design ap-
proaches rely on incorporating maximum extracted in-
formation from the training data, thereby conveying ex-
cessive information to an adversary and equipping it
with a thorough understanding of the impact of differ-
ent features to the classification task.
4.4. Analyzing effects of using randomization in the de-
fender’s model
Robustness via complex learning methodologies aims
at increasing the adversary’s effort, by making it reverse
engineer a large set of features, as seen in the case of
one-class classifiers and the feature bagged ensemble.
The other advocated approach to dealing with adver-
sarial activity relies on obfuscation via randomization.
By randomizing the feedback presented to the attacker,
these methodologies aim to mislead adversarial learning
from probes, leading to less effective attacks. Random-
ness can be introduced into multiple classifier systems,
particularly the ones using feature bagging. This is done
by training multiple models on subsets of features and
then using any one of these models to provide prediction
at any given time (Woz´niak et al., 2014; Biggio et al.,
2010a; Colbaugh and Glass, 2012b). The idea relies on
confusing the adversary by constantly presenting it with
a moving target. In this section, the impact of random-
ization is analyzed, when used with a feature bagged
ensemble, against indiscriminate evasion attacks.
Randomization is introduced into the defender’s
model, by extending the random subspace ensemble of
Section 4.3, to generate feedback based on the posterior
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Figure 13: Prediction landscape for the randomized feature bagging
ensemble. Blindspots are perceived to be obscured, while high confi-
dence spaces remain consistent across repeated probing.
probability for a given sample X. The use of random
subspace ensemble allows for the randomness be caused
due to disagreement between orthogonal feature infor-
mation. Given a sample X, the defender computes the
confidence on it, based on majority voting of its compo-
nent models. This confidence is then used as a probabil-
ity of prediction, to generate the class label for X. As an
example, consider a sample X for which the classifier
C predicts with 0.8 probability to be in the Legitimate
class. A standard threshold of 0.5, based on majority
voting, will cause the feedback on X to be of class Legit-
imate. To introduce randomness, the defender’s model
will instead sample number in the range of [0,1] and re-
turn feedback Legitimate, only if the random number is
>0.8. As such, randomness is introduced into the clas-
sification scheme, while still maintaining the essential
predictive properties of the classifier. Here, the adver-
sary may not be aware of the internal scoring or the ran-
domness of the black box model, as it still only experi-
ences the defender as a black box model providing Le-
gitimate/Malicious feedback on the submitted probe X.
The perceived space of the adversary is shown in Fig-
ure 13. The regions of uncertainty is heavily influenced
by randomness, due to the disagreement between mod-
els trained on the two features.
The effects of randomness is demonstrated over a
synthetic 2D dataset in Figure 14a), where the anchor
points (AP) attacks is used. The misleading feedback
from the defender, causes the exploration phase to be
corrupted, due to the naive assumption on the adver-
sary’s part about the veracity of the defender’s feedback.
This is presented in Figure 15 for the 5 datasets. An av-
erage drop of 22.9% in the Effective Attack Rate (EAR),
is seen.
The analysis of a naive adversary assumes that the de-
(a) Naive adversary
(b) Randomization aware adversary
Figure 14: Anchor Points attacks against a randomized defender. Top-
Naive adversary disregards randomness. Bottom- Adversary with con-
fidence filtering, repeated probing of exploration samples is used to
weed out samples with inconsistent feedback.
fender always returns the correct feedback on the sub-
mitted probes. This was seen to result in the attacker
being mislead, as seen for the EAR of the naive at-
tacker in Figure 14b). However, an adversary can be-
come aware of the randomness, by submitting the same
probe multiple times and observing different responses
on it. Such an adversary can account for randomness in
designing its attacks. A simple heuristic strategy is sim-
ulated here, to understand the behavior of such an adver-
sary. In the exploration phase, the adversary makes re-
peated submission on every exploration point, to under-
stand the defender’s confidence in the sample. A sample
which is closer to the training data, will generate feed-
back with more consistency, while samples falling in
blindspots will be more random in their feedback (Fig-
ure 13). Using this intuition, the the anchor points (AP)
attack strategy is modified, to account for smart adver-
saries capable of dealing with randomness. In the explo-
ration phase, the adversary submits each sample NRetries
(taken as 5 in experiments here) times, and accepts the
probe to belong to the Legitimate class, only if it returns
the same feedback for all NRetries times. All other sam-
ples are assumed to belong to the Malicious class. By
cleaning samples of low confidence, the blindspot ex-
ploration samples are removed, making the exploitation
phase more potent, as demonstrated in Figure 14b).
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Figure 15: Comparison of Effective Attack Rate (EAR) for Non robust
models, Robust models, Randomization based models, and Random-
ization models with adversaries capable of filtering low confidence
samples.
Applying the filtering step allows for simulating an
adversary capable of dealing with randomness. The re-
sults of such an adversary is shown in Figure 15, where
an increase in 16.7% in the EAR is seen, for such attack-
ers. After this filtering, the attacks are similar to that on
a robust model, with only a 5.1% difference on average.
This demonstrates the ineffectiveness of the randomiza-
tion approaches in providing security, against probing
based attacks. There is increased onus on an adversary
to use more probes to validate the exploration samples,
but if a possible adversary makes this additional invest-
ment, incentivized by a high EAR, the randomization
approach fails.
4.5. Why informative models are ill suited for adversar-
ial environments?
The evaluation of classifier design from the perspec-
tive of adversarial uncertainty provides new insights
into their vulnerabilities, when applied in a dynamic
adversarial environment. The model design strategies
of one-class classifiers, robust feature bagging models
and randomized feature bagging models, are all suscep-
tible to attacks which can leave detection and retrain-
ing, intractable. All these methodologies try to include
the maximum information from the training data, into
the learned model, in order to maintain an informa-
tion advantage over the adversary. This is seen to be
the general trend in the adversarial machine learning re-
search community (Papernot et al., 2016c; Biggio et al.,
2010a, 2014a), where including more information into
the models is believed to make it more secure. How-
ever, incorporating more information into the learned
model means that the adversary will be able to reverse
engineer and learn more of this information from the
deployed model, via probing. In case of a one-class
classifier, which advocates using maximal information
to develop a tight boundary around the training data,
it was seen that an attacker is led straight to the space
of the legitimate data (Section 4.2). In case of Robust-
ness and Randomization, information available is made
harder to mimic/extract. In robustness, more features
need to be mimicked to gain access, while randomiza-
tion aims to mislead the adversary’s learning. It is seen
that both fail against a determined adversary, who given
time/resources can learn and leverage all the available
information.
Robust models are also seen to fail at detection and
recovery, when faced with an adversary who is capable
of generating high confidence attacks. These also stems
from the increased availability of probe-able informa-
tion, to be used by an adversary. These defense strate-
gies relies of unrealistic assumption on the adversary’s
part, to ensure safety. It is generally assumed that if
an attack is too expensive (i.e., requires many probes or
the modification of many features), the adversary will
give up. While this assumption is the basis of secu-
rity against targeted evasion attacks, it does not hold in
case of indiscriminate exploratory attacks. This section
aimed to highlight some of the issues with incorporat-
ing excessive information into the defender’s model. In
an adversarial domain, the attack is a function of the de-
ployed model. A highly informative model will lead to
a highly confident attack. It is necessary to reevaluate
this central idea of overly informative defender models,
and analyze the effects of causing an information gap
between the defender and the attacker, for improving
security.
5. Ensuring long term dynamic security by hiding
feature importance
The approaches of Complex learning and Random-
ization, rely on including maximum information from
the training dataset, into the learned model. As such,
they are vulnerable to information leakage via adversar-
ial probing and reverse engineering. Experimentation in
Section 4, demonstrated that a classifier which exposes
excessive information about the feature importance is
susceptible to high confidence attacks. The increased
confidence in attacks leads to issues with adversarial
detect-ability, data leakage and retrain-ability. As such,
the impact and ability to hide the importance of some of
the features, to ensure that the model is shielded from
total reverse engineering, is evaluated here. This ap-
proach presents a counter-intuitive idea, as it advocates
reducing the amount of information incorporated into
the deployed model.
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5.1. Motivation for feature importance hiding
The notion behind feature importance hiding relies
on eliminating a few of the important features from the
classification training phase, so as to intentionally mis-
represent their importance to an external adversary. By
eliminating these features from the classification model,
the adversary is made to believe that they are not impor-
tant for the prediction task. No amount of probing will
help the adversary to ascertain the importance of the
hidden features, as their importance and informative-
ness is shielded from the classification task. Although,
this does not provide any direct benefits against the on-
set of evasion attacks, they help in maintaining adver-
sarial uncertainty. An attacker will not be able to com-
pletely reverse engineer the importance of all features,
no matter the resources/time used by it, as they are not
available in the black box model.
The idea of feature importance hiding, is illustrated
in Figure 16. The prediction landscapes of the fol-
lowing classifiers are depicted: a) A restrictive classi-
fier aggregating all feature information (X1 ∧ X2), b)
A randomization based classifier which picks its output
based on either feature’s prediction (X1 ∨ X2), and c)
The hidden feature classifier where feature X2’s influ-
ence is hidden. The choice of these designs affects the
adversarial uncertainty, at test time. Based on experi-
mentation in Section 4.2 and Section 4.4, we see that
restrictive models (a)) and randomization models (b))
are ineffective, as an intelligent adversary can reverse
engineer them to generate high confidence attacks. The
robust model of Figure 16 a) reduces the effective space
of legitimate samples, but in doing so it leaks informa-
tion about the importance of features X1 and X2. The
randomized model of Figure 16 b), aims to mislead the
adversarial probing, but is vulnerable to repeated prob-
ing attacks, as demonstrated in Section 4.4. In case of
the hidden feature importance design of Figure 16 c),
an adversary sees a misrepresented view of the predic-
tion landscape. The adversary is led to believe that only
feature X1 is important to the defender’s model. Since
C2 is kept hidden, the attacker has information about
only half the feature space and no amount of probing
will help it understand the importance of feature X2 to
the prediction problem. Attacks generated at test time,
will fall under the blue region to make them effective,
and when they do so, they have 50% chance of falling
under the blindspot B2. B2 serves as a honeypot in the
learned model, which helps capture attacks. An impor-
tant distinction between the robustness and randomiza-
tion approaches, in comparison to the hidden classifier
approach, is that in the former case the defender expects
the adversary to be dissuaded by the increased cost of
Figure 16: Prediction landscapes as perceived by probing on the de-
fender models. a): Defender model is given as C1∧C2. b): Defender
model given by randomly selecting C1 ∨ C2, to perform prediction.
c): Defender model is given by C1 (trained on feature X1), while C2
is kept hidden to detect adversarial activity. Blindspot(Margin) B2
denotes region for adversarial uncertainty.
evasion (in terms of probing budget), while in the latter
case, the defender is making it unfeasible for an attacker
to probe and obtain information necessary to generate a
high confidence attack.
It should be noted that, the idea of hiding feature im-
portance is not in direct violation of the Kerckhoffs’s
security principle (Kerckhoffs, 1883; Mrdovic and Pe-
runicic, 2008), which states that security should not rely
solely on the unavailability of information, on the part
of the adversary. This is because the defender is not us-
ing hidden features, but only misleading the adversary
into believing that a few of the features are not impor-
tant to the prediction task. As in Figure 16, the attacker
is aware of features X1 and X2, but infers that only X1
is important to the classification task. All features are
included in the classification model, but by intention-
ally hiding the importance of a subset of the features,
the adversary is misled into generating attacks of par-
tial confidence only (i.e., partially mimics the training
legitimate data).
5.2. Evaluation of effects of feature importance hiding
In order to demonstrate the effect of hiding feature
importance, experimentation is presented on a classifier
model with 50% of the features intentionally eliminated
from the classification process, in Table 5. A random
subspace model is chosen as the defender’s model (50
Linear SVM, 50% of features per model). A random
subset of 50% of the features are considered to be elim-
inated from the classification process. This is done by
eliminating the features from the training dataset, and
then training the defender’s model on the reduced set of
features. Any incoming probe is first truncated to the re-
duced feature set and then evaluated on the model. This
makes the feature reduction strategy opaque to the ex-
ternal users. The results of the Anchor Points - High
Attacks (AP - HC) attacks on this classifier is presented
in Table 5. The Effective Attack Rate (EAR) and the
Adversarial Margin Density (AMD), are evaluated on
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Table 5: Training Accuracy, Effective attack rate (EAR) and Adversarial Margin Density (AMD) under AP-HC attacks, for defender using all
features and one which uses only half of the features.
Dataset
Training
Accuracy EAR AMD
All Features Hidden Features All Features Hidden Features All Features Hidden Features
Synthetic 100 100 1 0.99 0.01 0.172
CAPTCHA 100 100 0.99 0.99 0.002 0.075
Phishing 93.1 89.4 0.99 0.99 0.19 0.562
Digits08 97.1 95.1 0.99 0.99 0.22 0.648
Digits17 99.5 94.9 0.98 0.99 0.16 0.517
Table 6: Effective Attack Rate (EAR) of models trained on Available
and on the Hidden features, after AP-HC attack.
Dataset EARAvailable
Features
Hidden
Features
Synthetic 0.99 0.67
CAPTCHA 0.99 0.65
Phishing 0.99 0.47
Digits08 0.99 0.32
Digits17 0.99 0.32
this hidden feature classifier design and also a baseline
classifier which uses all features in its model.
It can be seen that the training accuracy is only
marginally affected (<5% difference at max), by the re-
duction of features from the models. This is a result of
the presence of orthogonal information in the features
of the training data. In case of a robust ensemble de-
sign, which incorporates all information in the model,
the AMD is seen to drop as the attacks leverage the or-
thogonal information from the probes, to avoid regions
of low certainty. However, for the hidden features ap-
proach, a significantly higher AMD value is seen in all
cases (0.28, on average). This is because no amount
of probing and cleansing will help the adversary in de-
termining that the hidden features are important to the
classification, and what exact values of the features they
need to mimic. The EAR of all attacks is comparable
to that of the robust classifier (Table 5). However, the
increased AMD ensures that the defender has an up-
per hand in the attack-defense cycle, as it can detect at-
tacks and keep the training data clean for future retrain-
ing. This makes hiding of feature importance an effec-
tive strategy in providing reactive security to adversarial
drift. The notion of hiding feature importance suggests
that not all information available at the training phase
should be used at the same time, to ensure leverage over
the adversary. A high AMD ensures that attacks can be
detected and can be recovered from. The EAR of the
two models: a) trained on the available set of features
and b) trained on the hidden features, is shown in Ta-
ble 6. It is seen that, while model trained on the set of
available features is ultimately evaded by an adversary,
the hidden features provide for a relatively unattacked
set of information, which can be leveraged for retrain-
ing and continued usage, in a dynamic environment.
6. Towards a Dynamic-Adversarial mining approach
The analysis in this paper, takes initial steps towards
understanding the security of machine learning as a
holistic approach, combining proactive and reactive se-
curity measures. Long term effects of training time de-
sign decisions are analyzed. It was shown that restric-
tive classifier designs can be damaging for long term
security, as they lead to data leakage and inseparability,
after attacks. Based on the analysis, a counter-intuitive
strategy was proposed, which advocates shielding of
feature importance information.
While existing works on Proactive and on Reactive
security have largely been carried out in isolation from
each other, there is a need for a combined dynamic view
of the problem. Proactive steps can be taken in model
development, to make subsequent detection and retrain-
ing easier. Similarly, honeypots and randomization, can
be used effectively to delay the onset of attacks. The
study of adversarial drift, as a specific case of the larger
field of concept drift, is important to understand how
adversarial behavior is affected by design decisions of
the learned model. As adversarial drift is dependent on
the defender’s model (which the attacker is trying to re-
verse engineer and evade), it could be possible to train
models to mislead adversary, and not just improve gen-
eralization.
A holistic view of the security would understand that
it is a cyclic process, where delaying attacks, detecting
them and then recovering, are all equally important to
meet the system’s security goals. A dynamic security
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paradigm would take proactive measures to delay at-
tacks, and to make their subsequent detection and fixing
easier, as well. As such metrics like Attack delay, Diffi-
culty to reverse engineer, Detect-ability of vulnerability
of classifiers, and Recover-ability after attacks; are more
useful to dynamic security, than the traditional metrics
of accuracy, precision and recall. Also, dynamic secu-
rity needs to operate as a never-ending learning scheme,
with efficient involvement of human in the loop, to pro-
vide expertise and retraining ability, from time to time.
The interdisciplinary field of Dynamic-Adversarial
mining (Figure 17), needs to incorporate lessons learned
from: Machine Learning, Cybersecurity and Stream
Data Mining; to rethink use of machine learning in secu-
rity applications and develop systems which are ‘secure
by design’ (Biggio et al., 2014a). Some core ideas under
the dynamic adversarial mining scheme are:
• Ability to leave feature space honeypots in the
learned classifier at training time, to efficiently de-
tect attacks using unlabeled data at test time.
• Semi automated self aware algorithms, which can
detect abnormal data distribution shifts, at test
time.
• Maintaining multiple backup models, which can
provide prediction when the main model gets at-
tacked.
• Ability to use a stream labeling budget effectively
and to distribute the budget appropriately, to de-
tect and fix attacks. Thereby, managing human in-
volvement in the process.
• Understanding attack vulnerabilities on classifiers,
from a purely data driven perspective, to effectively
test the security measures employed.
This work takes steps towards an integrated ap-
proach of machine learning security, under the canopy
of Dynamic-Adversarial mining. Our work aims to en-
courage further awareness and interest in the need for a
dynamic security paradigm, by bringing together ideas
from the domains of Streaming data and Cybersecurity.
7. Conclusion and future work
Although the naive application of machine learning,
has found early success in many domains, its abilities
and vulnerabilities are still not well understood. To se-
cure machine learning and to make it usable in a long
term dynamic environment, it is necessary to adopt a
Figure 17: The field of Dynamic Adversarial Mining, will derive from
the concepts of Machine learning, Stream data mining and Cyberse-
curity.
holistic view in its analysis. In this paper, the short-
comings in popular classifier design strategies is high-
lighted, as they tend to approach security from a static
perspective. Approaches such as restrictive one class
classifiers, robust feature bagged ensembles and ran-
domization based ensembles, are all found to leak ex-
cessive information to the adversary. This excessive in-
formation can be leveraged by an intelligent adversary,
who can launch attacks, such that future detection and
recovery from attacks is made difficult. Such vulnera-
bilities are introduced into the machine learning model,
due to the widely accepted philosophy of incorporating
excessive information into the defender’s model, in the
hopes of making it more secure. However, a dynamic
analysis of this philosophy shows that it is not applica-
ble as a long term solution.
Based on the analysis of the static solutions, a novel
Dynamic-Adversarial aware solution is proposed. This
methodology intelligently shields a subset of the fea-
tures, from being probed and leaked to the adversary,
by hiding their impact on the classification task. This
resulted in adversary’s with a misguided sense of con-
fidence and also enables better attack detection and re-
cover. The proposed methodology serves as a blueprint
for further research in the area of Dynamic-Adversarial
mining, where a holistic approach to security will lead
to long term benefits for the defender. Future work will
concentrate on developing secure methods for retraining
classifiers, with the new labeled data. Also, the devel-
opment of an adversarial aware concept drift handling
methodology, is an area warranting further research.
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